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Abstract  
This paper investigates the extent to which different type of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) practice 
beneficiary accountability (transparency, participation, and complaints procedure) within their own structure. 
Geographically, it focuses on Italian CSOs. On methodological level, a multiple case study analysis has been 
carried out. In particular, five CSOs had been purposefully selected and twenty multiple interviews with CSO 
managers and key accountability stakeholders/beneficiaries were conducted to allow data triangulation. Research 
findings indicate that beneficiary accountability is performed differently by diverse CSOs and it appears weak, 
informal and inconsistent across case-studies, especially in relation to compliance procedure and direct means of 
participation: the latter are poorly implemented regardless of congenital differences among CSOs (e.g. size, type 
and nature).  
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Sumário  
Este artigo investiga até que ponto diferentes tipos de organizações da sociedade civil (OSC) praticam a 
responsabilização dos beneficiários (procedimento de transparência, participação e reclamações) dentro de sua 
própria estrutura. Geograficamente, ele se concentra nas OSC italianas. Em nível metodológico, foi realizada uma 
análise de estudo de caso múltiplo. Em particular, cinco OSCs foram selecionadas de propósito e vinte entrevistas 
múltiplas com gerentes de OSCs e principais partes interessadas / beneficiários de responsabilidade foram 
conduzidas para permitir a triangulação dos dados. Os resultados da pesquisa indicam que a prestação de contas 
dos beneficiários é realizada de maneira diferente por diversas OSCs e parece fraca, informal e inconsistente nos 
estudos de caso, especialmente em relação ao procedimento de conformidade e aos meios diretos de participação: 
os últimos são mal implementados, independentemente das diferenças congênitas entre as OSCs (por exemplo, 
tamanho, tipo e natureza). 
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1. Introduction 
 
The debate on accountability of Civil Society Organisations (‘CSOs’) began in the 
middle of the 1990s in light of their rapid growth in terms of size, visibility and political 
influence, coupled with a series of high-profile scandals and allegations of bad performance in 
achieving transformative goals (Naidoo, 2003). Since then, civil society scholars have explored 
“for what”, “to whom” and “how” CSOs should be accountable for their actions highlighting 
that CSOs are underperforming in terms of accountability, paying little attention to their 
beneficiaries: the people they provide service to or on whose behalf the organisations claim to 
be working with.1 
Conceptually, the term ‘accountability’ can mean different things depending on the 
context and the aim for which accountability is sough. In broad terms, it refers to the right to 
require an account, but in the context of CSOs a widely referenced definition of accountability 
in the academic literature is the one provided by Hugo Slim, who frames the concept as“(…) 
a process by which an organisation holds itself openly responsible for what it believes, what it 
does and what it does not do in a way which shows it involving all concerned parties and 
actively responding to what it learns” (Slim, 2002).  
Due to the absence of an institutional framework that sets out how CSOs should be 
held accountable, scholars have tried to identify to whom CSOs should be held to account for 
their actions. Initially, the concept of CSO accountability was based on the principal-agent 
model according to which a principal confers authority to an agent to act in their interests and 
accountability is ensured through economic incentives and legal sanctions (Kovach et al., 
2003). However, this approach was considered inappropriate because it allows exclusively 
those with formal authority over an organisation (e.g. donors or government) to hold it to 
account, without providing a paradigm through which other parties (such as beneficiaries) 
affected by an organisation’s actions could exercise their legitimate right to require an account 
(Anheier and Hawkes, 2009). Beside the principal agent model, another traditional 
accountability model is the representative democratic accountability approach developed in the 
field of social democratic theory (Brown, 2007).  
Originally designed to operationalise accountability within democratically elected 
public and private institutions, this model follows the assumption that elected representatives 
can be held accountable by their constituencies who can vote their representatives out of office 
in case of wrongdoing or poor-performance.  
                                               
1  The word “beneficiaries” is contested by some scholars as it could imply that the CSO’s practitioners/workers see themselves as providing 
benefits to a passive recipient. For this reason, the word has been replaced with other equally contestable labels such as “constituencies”, 
“clients”, “primary stakeholders”, “participants”, “target group” or “intended beneficiaries”. Throughout this paper I use the term 
“beneficiary” as a technical term and I define them, in broad terms, as those people that CSOs provide services to or speak on behalf of 
in policy forums. For the purpose of this paper the term “beneficiary” should be broadly understood, given the variety of CSOs under 
empirical investigation. Please note that the terms “beneficiary accountability” and “downward accountability” are used interchangeably 
throughout this paper, even if it has been pointed out that the use of the term “downward” accountability can exaggerate the weakness of 
the beneficiary, worsening the essential element of authority inherent in the accountability relationship. 
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Just as the principal-agent model, the representative model does not fit the CSO’s 
structure as practitioners are, in many instances, unelected and self-appointed (this is typically 
the case of service-provider), and even when a CSO has a membership structure in place, its 
goals and mission are set a priori rather than being decided at membership level (Walker, 
2003). In light of this, the principal-agent and the representative models have been succeeded 
by the stakeholder theory, which confers the right to require an account to anyone who could 
be potentially affected by the organisation’s actions (Kovach et al., 2003).  
According to the stakeholder theory, CSOs are accountable: 
• Upward and externally to donors and the government (i.e. those that provide 
them with their financial and legal base) 
• Downward to their beneficiaries (i.e. those that they provide services to or 
speak on behalf of in policy forums) 
• Internally to themselves for their organisational mission, values and staff. 
• Horizontally to their peers. 
With such a range of stakeholders, CSOs are required to fulfil different responsibilities 
to a variety of subjects who have different expectations of CSO performance and how that 
performance is reported (Crane and Matter, 2010). CSO accountability suddenly appears “weak 
and problematic, since there is no clear ‘bottom line’ for results and no single authority to 
which CSOs must report on their activities” (Edwards, 2000).  
Consequently, an organisation would successfully achieve accountability only if it is 
able to fulfil its responsibilities by adopting different means and tools towards various 
stakeholders. Nowadays, the most popular mechanisms of accountability are: disclosure 
statement and report, performance assessment and evaluation, participation and self-regulation 
(Ebrahim, 2003).  
In assessing these mechanisms of accountability along the vertical dimension of 
accountability (upward/downward), it emerges that CSOs tend to emphasise upward 
accountability to donors and regulators while mechanisms of downward accountability to 
beneficiaries remain undeveloped and little practiced by CSOs (Ebrahim, 2003).  
Mary Caldor has highlighted that the lack of downward accountability is intrinsically 
related to the solidaristic nature of CSOs and the fact that donors are not the same as 
beneficiaries (Caldor, 2003). Essentially, beneficiaries are neither customers nor electors of an 
organisation because they have a restricted ability to shape and influence CSO actions as voters 
do with governments, and usually do not pay or choose the services they receive as customers 
do with companies (Spiro, 2002). 
When it comes to performing accountability, CSOs tend to prioritise certain 
relationships over others, usually in favour of the donors or government, rather than in favour 
of the beneficiaries (Lee, 2004). Donors often dominate the debate on whether upward 
accountability or downward accountability should be a priority due to the strong dependence 
of CSOs on their financial support (Najam, 1996).  
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Similarly, a government creates the regulatory environment within which CSOs 
operate and a government has significant leverage to guarantee accountability. Conversely, 
beneficiaries have a limited capacity to hold CSOs to account as they cannot withdraw funding 
-like donors - and they cannot impose conditionalities on CSO activities - like governments 
(Newell and Bellour, 2002). On a practical level, accountability to beneficiaries is shaped by 
ethical imperatives and, most of the time, it relies on the “grace and favour” of practitioners 
(Kilby, 2006).  
It would be wrong to assume, however, that the donor or government-CSO 
relationship is the one and only cause of weak accountability performance of CSO towards its 
beneficiaries. Indeed, researchers have shown that difficulties in straightening mechanisms of 
downward accountability can be dictated by the competence levels of CSO staff or cultural 
differences between the staff and the people that they work with (Roche, 2009).  
Other barriers to beneficiaries’ participation in CSO governance include the lack of 
time and resources to implement participatory mechanisms (Bess et al., 2009). Some 
researchers have shown that some stakeholders question whether beneficiaries are the best 
judges of their interests and whether they have the skills and knowledge necessary to influence 
CSO governance (Cornwall, 2008). Other studies have highlighted how some stakeholders 
doubt whether beneficiaries really want accountability, as the demand for downward 
accountability is not often raised and formulated by the beneficiaries themselves (Dwyer and 
Unerman, 2009). 
Academics have shown that the lack of beneficiary accountability is a critical concern, 
since the legitimacy of CSOs is grounded on their ties with beneficiariesand the spread of 
management procedures within CSOs is distorting the definition of accountability, favouring a 
tendency to “accountancy” which focuses mainly on tangible products and quantitative results 
rather than on qualitative social achievements (Ebrahim, 2003).  
This process of marketisation of CSOs poses serious questions about their ability in 
building long-term transformative goals, leading to undesirable consequences in the process of 
empowerment of beneficiaries (Banks et al., 2015). This is why the literature unanimously calls 
CSOs to explore new ways to align mechanisms of downward (beneficiaries) and upward 
(donor and government) accountability (Banks et al., 2015; Ebrahim, 2003; Kilby, 2006; Lee, 
2004; Pratt, 2009; Jacobs and Wolford, 2010; Crack, 2013). 
 
2. Research question, rationale for case-study and paper’s structure 
 
Starting from the above observation, this paper will investigate the extent to which 
different type of CSOs practice beneficiary accountability (transparency, participation, and 
complaints procedure) within their own structure. It will answer to the following question: to 
what extent are CSOs accountable to the people they provide service to or on whose behalf the 
organisations claim to be working?  
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To answer this question, this research will use Italian CSOs as a case-study. The focus 
on Italy can be justified upon four reasons. First, the Italian-third sector has grown 
exponentially in the last 15 years andproliferation and professionalisation of CSOs are 
generally considered two factors which call for a greater accountability (ISTAT, 2011).  
Secondly, the gap between the richest and poorest in society reached its highest level 
in decades because of the sovereign debt crisis, which erupted across the Eurozone in 2010, 
and as a consequence of the austerity policies implemented by the national Government in 
those years (ISTAT, 2013). 
At that time, Italy, together with Greece, hosted the highest number of asylum seekers 
and economic migrants among all European countries since the Arab Spring sparked across 
North Africa and the Middle East (BBC, 2014). In this scenario, CSOs obviously had a lot of 
work to do, not only in terms of campaigning for and providing services to people in need, but 
they had also been involved in rescuing, assisting and transporting migrants across the 
Mediterranean Sea. Thirdly, a series of high-profile scandals – the most known was the ‘Mafia 
Capitale’ Scandal (2015) – have revealed that the sector is seriously exposed to infiltrations by 
criminal gangs who have speculated on beneficiaries service-provision (particularly Roma 
groups and asylum seekers) by manipulating CSOs to achieve illicit means. Fourthly, the 
Italian Government has recently reformed the third sector as a whole through the “Riforma del 
terzo settore, dell’impresa sociale e per la disciplina del servizio civile universale” (Third-
Sector Reform, August 2017) addressing aspects of transparency, accountability and sectoral 
supervision. 
In terms of paper’s structure, the next section provides the methodological framework 
outlining sampling strategy, selection of CSOs and research participants, data gathering and 
data analysis. A detailed description of the findings for each dimension of beneficiary 
accountability is provided within the three main sections of this paper: section 4.a deals with 
transparency, section 4.b discusses the matter of participation and section 4.c is about 
complaints procedure. To preview the outcome of this paper, research findings indicate that 
beneficiary accountability is performed differently by diverse CSOs and it appears weak, 
informal and inconsistent across case-studies, especially in relation to compliance procedure 
and direct means of participation: the latter are poorly implemented regardless of congenital 
differences among CSOs (e.g. size, type and nature). The conclusion will summarise the key 
findings, outlining policy proposals for CSOs, and discusse the contribution of the paper for 
the literature. 
 
3. Methodology: a multiple case-study analysis 
 
A qualitative approach to study the issue of downward accountability was adopted, 
employing a multiple case study methodology. In particular, maximum variation 
(heterogeneity) and criterion sampling was used to select case-studies (Patton, 2002). The use 
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of such sampling technique was dictated by the fact that the Italian third-sector is profoundly 
heterogeneous with considerable diversity among CSOs in terms of size, area of activity and 
type.  
Additionally, the literature has clarified the issue of downward accountability is more 
obvious and more problematic for certain CSOs than others. For instance, the need for 
increased accountability is particularly accentuated in service-provider organisations, where 
beneficiaries are usually external actors to the organisation, and therefore have less voice in 
shaping its activities and direction (Ebrahim, 2010).  
The lack of accountability can cause similar problems for advocacy CSOs and 
International-NGOs speaking on behalf of unorganised and marginalised people in policy 
forums (Peruzzotti, 2006). As to International-NGOs, these work for and with people who are 
neither represented as members of the organisation nor reside in the same country as the NGO’s 
decision-makers (Berghmans et al., 2017).  
The issue of downward accountability is instead less problematic for membership-
based organisations as they are often run by and for their members who are also service 
recipients. In this case, members do have a wide range of informal accountability mechanisms 
available: the exercise of “voice” by voting for the organisation’s leaders, “exit” by revoking 
membership or joining another organisation, and “loyalty” by attempting to reform the 
organisation either by influencing leaders or by running for a leadership position (Ebrahim, 
2010).  
Finally, the lack of downward accountability does not usually represent a problem for 
small size CSOs because they normally establish very tight relationships with their 
beneficiaries, developing a high level of trust or “organic accountability” such that formal 
mechanisms would introduce unnecessary bureaucracy (Pratt, 2009). 
Consequently, 5 CSOs were selected based on three organisational attributes/criteria: 
sector of activity, type and size. Initially, case-studies were chosen based on their type: service 
provider, membership and advocacy-oriented organisations. With a similar reasoning, it was 
considered appropriate to choose CSOs profoundly diverse one other in terms of size including 
small, medium and large CSOs. Overall, the selection criteria ensured that a sufficient number 
of diverse organisations were included in the study. Since the interview questions focused on 
topics that might be judged as sensitive and/or controversial by CSOs, anonymity was assured 
for both the CSOs selected and the participants.  
A letter of the Greek alphabet has been attributed to each organisation to ensure 
anonymity. The selection process was developed in order to reach maximum variation in line 
with the main research question, resulting into a sample size that led to theoretical saturation. 
In particular, maximum variation was achieved in terms of size by choosing one large (Alpha), 
one large/medium (Beta), one medium (Gamma) and two small CSOs (Delta and Epsilon). 
Similarly, maximum variation was obtained by selecting two membership CSOs (Alpha and 
Epsilon – both involved in advocacy works) and three service-provider CSOs (Beta, Gamma 
and Delta), two of them conducting also advocacy work (Beta and Gamma). Lastly, the five 
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CSOs selected operate in five different industries (ranging from civil rights protection to 
international cooperation and political education) and have different organisational structures. 
20 qualitative interviews with CSOs managers and key accountability 
stakeholders/beneficiaries were conducted to allow data triangulation, as the use of many 
different information sources is crucial to provide depth to the case and the diversity of 
information allows transferability within and across cases (Stravros and Westberg, 2009). Data 
were collected between April and September 2017 during fieldwork in Italy.  
During data collection triangulation was performed by interviewing various 
respondents (managers and key accountability stakeholders/beneficiaries) on the same topic 
(synchronic primary data source triangulation) as well as by the combination of primary and 
secondary data sources (Pauwels et al., 2004). In fact, all CSOs managers were asked to provide 
appropriate secondary data documents (feedback forms, budget documentation, 
questionnaires) that were relevant to the answers given. In some instances, other documents 
such as press reports and promotion materials were obtained independently. The most 
important function of documents is “(…) to corroborate and augment evidence from other 
sources” (Yin, 1994). 
Beyond mere data triangulation, the choice of interviewing beneficiaries together with 
managers was related to the fact that the vast majority of the research on the topic relies on 
empirical data gathered with CSO managers, employees and occasionally volunteers (Mitchell, 
2012; Tayşir and Tayşir, 2012). Ironically, even those studies that aimed to demonstrate the 
positive effects that beneficiary participation can bring to CSOs (e.g. increased effectiveness 
of delivered services or increased legitimacy), or how beneficiary involvement can be 
implemented through various participating mechanisms, failed to take into account the 
beneficiaries’ perspectives (Andreassen, 2008; Hidayana and Noor, 2015).  
In order to justify this approach, it was argued that studying CSO beneficiaries is 
complicated because they constitute a very diverse stakeholder group, and this heterogeneity 
makes beneficiary-related generalisations challenging or sometimes misleading, and objective 
parameters to evaluate beneficiary involvement effects on CSO governance are not yet 
available (Wellens and Jegers, 2013). Despite these complications, researchers have recently 
begun to conduct research engaging directly with CSO beneficiaries, proving that studying 
CSO accountability from a beneficiary perspective is possible instead (Chanrith, 2004; 
Packard, 2010; Jacobs and Wolford, 2010; Walsh, 2016; Wellens and Jegers, 2014; Seabe 
2016; Omona and Mukuye 2013).The methods employed to engage with beneficiaries vary 
from semi-structured interviews and informal talks (with beneficiaries, their representatives or 
community leaders) to observational research (e.g. project-site observation) in the case of 
qualitative research.  
In these cases, the methodological choice of interviewing beneficiaries was a powerful 
means of data triangulation through which researchers were able to corroborate, slim down or 
deny overrating statements made by managers about their accountability performance. In few 
cases, researchers were able to discuss, rate and record people’s perceptions about the 
accountability performance of CSOs through questionnaires complemented with participatory 
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exercises employing numerical parameters (e.g. asking to rate from 0-5 a series of statements 
related to key accountability mechanisms).  
All of these examples demonstrate that researchers are paving the way for a 
beneficiaries-oriented approach on the matter, providing a methodological pattern that can be 
potentially applied to study different CSOs simultaneously. This is precisely the 
methodological path followed by this paper.  
In this research, the interview consisted of a self-assessment exercise for CSOs 
managers related to the key accountability components (Transparency, Participation and 
Complaint Procedure). The interview questions were based on the Beneficiaries Checklist 
developed by Mango (that provides concrete benchmark for measuring adequately downward 
accountability) which has been tailored for the purpose of this research.2Essentially, 
participants were asked to consider the organisational performance in relation to various 
practical points, and to give their organisation a score from 0 to 5. At the end of each question 
participants were asked to provide further information/comments (qualitative explanation) on 
each practical action and on the score given.  Framing and conducting the interviews in the 
format of a self-assessment tool was crucial in order to minimize a feeling, among the 
participants, of being assessed or judged for their accountability performance. Without doubt, 
ensuring anonymity to the organisation as well as to participants played a key role in ensuring 
maximum honesty in the response.  
Prior to initiating data analysis, all interviews were transcribed and subsequently 
translated from Italian into English. Every statement contained in this paper was sent to the 
relevant research participant for validation. Relevant themes for the data analysis were 
identified a priori and embodied into interview questions. All questions were aimed at 
identifying the presence of mechanisms of accountability and to what extent they are 
implemented. These objective, interpretation-free information were easily corroborated both 
by secondary sources as well as by synchronic primary data source.  
Brief notes and short answers taken while interviews facilitated the process of data 
triangulation and data analysis. In general, analysis was articulated into two steps: within-case 
and across-case analyses. First, data were analysed within each case-study by linking and 
aggregating under relevant themes all evidence gathered. Within-case re-analysis was 
gradually conducted on each case-study looking also at the evidence emerging progressively 
from other each case; in other words, data related to Alfa where also examined in light of data 
emerging from Beta and vice versa. Finally, cross-case comparison was performed by 
converging data emerging from each case-study linking patterns of similarities and differences. 
  
                                               
2Mango is a well-established UK-based charity that exists to strengthen the financial management of CSOs. Mango publishes freely-available 
tools, such as the “accountability beneficiaries check-list”, as well as running training courses and providing finance staff to work with 
CSOs. For more information, see <www.mango.org.uk> last accessed 20/09/18. The original version of the checklist is available at 
<https://www.mango.org.uk/pool/g-accountability-to-beneficiaries-checklist.pdf> last accessed 24/09/18. The “beneficiary 
accountability check-list” has already been employed by other researchers (see, for example, Hidayana and Noor, 2015).   
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4. Findings and data discussion 
 
Research findings emerging from the multiple-case study analysis have been 
summarised inTable 1.The table is structured as follows. On the first column on the left side, 
the three key dimensions of downward accountability are listed progressively from the top to 
the bottom (transparency, participation and complaints procedure). The column to the right is 
articulated into seven rows. The four rows on the top concern the sub-dimensions of 
transparency, distinguishing between background and basic information, contact details, data 
about financial and organisational performance and those regarding activities and campaigns. 
The two rows located in the middle of the list are about the two sub-dimensions of 
participation: a) representative bodies and b) evaluation tools and direct means of participation. 
The bottom row regards the complaints procedure. The five remaining columns, going from 
left to right side of the table, display the findings for each organization vertically. Horizontally, 
it is possible to appreciate the distinctions across CSOs within each sub-dimension of 
downward accountability. Across the table, there are several words in bold underlined (double 
emphasis): this implies, for example, that in terms of transparency the information is both 
disclosed and communicated in an accessible way (e.g. simplified version of the document or 
translation into a foreign language). Where no information is reported on the table, the 
organisation has failed to implement downward accountability. Throughout all the following 
article’s sections there will be an in-depth discussion of the findings exploring the three 
dimensions of downward accountability in greater detail. 
 
a. Transparency 
 
The table shows that all CSOs disclose information regarding background 
information, organisational activities and public events employing digital tools (website, social 
media) and more traditional means (flyers, brochures, posters, press conferences and 
publications). Besides these means, it is observed that Alpha advertises organisational activities 
and campaigns through nine self-managed radio stations. In general, research respondents 
(other than managers) across case studies positively perceive how transparency is performed 
by CSOs, assigning them always the highest score (4-5):  
In terms of transparency, the organisation is great (…) when you trust the 
organisation, you do not even ask a lot of questions” (Local Activist/Supporter 3, 
Beta). “I never had a problem understanding how money is being spent because we 
discuss and approve the financial budget during the annual assembly” (Voluntary 
Group Representative, Gamma). “The organisation is very transparent and the 
communication with the board members is frequent. If something is unclear, for 
example some aspects of the budget, the treasurer is always willing to respond to our 
enquires (Member Representative 1, Epsilon). 
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While the first respondent (Local Activist/Supporter 3, Beta) suggests that formal 
mechanisms of transparency can even appear superfluous when a CSO is trusted 
blindly(Laughlin, 1996), the other two respondents suggest that financial information becomes 
easily readable when discussed through participatory means (annual assembly) or with a 
professional (treasurer) who is in charge of it at the organisational level.  
It is however in the area of governance and finance that the five CSOs perform 
transparency inconsistently. This is the area where the main differences emerge across case 
studies. In particular, the financial budget is published online by three CSOs (Alpha, Beta and 
Gamma). As to performance reporting, only one CSO (Beta) discloses its Annual Report 
online, whereas, the remaining four (Alpha, Delta, Gamma and Epsilon) fail to do so. Further 
difference across case studies is detected in relation to the dissemination of board members’ 
CV. Only two CSOs (Gamma and Epsilon) provide a brief biography of their board members. 
An organisational chart together with a list of contact details is employed by Alpha, Gamma 
and Epsilon.In addition to this, the findings show that very little attention is paid to the way in 
which all information is disclosed to make them accessible and intelligible to all beneficiaries. 
For instance, Beta publishes its background information both in English and in the languages 
spoken by local communities to whom it provides services. The same organisation also 
publishes a simplified version online – only one page long – of its financial budget, but the 
document is available exclusively in Italian. In order to simplify communication among 
members, Epsilon provides an interactive organisational chart on its website which allows 
beneficiaries to identify managers based on their territorial location, area of activity and 
organisational role. 
In order to explore these diversities detected across case studies, research findings will 
be discussed more in depth in the following sub-sections. It will be shown that the extent to 
which information is disclosed is often dictated by organisational size, type and/or by legal 
requirements. Simultaneously, it will be shown that a failure to divulge information adequately 
can interfere negatively with beneficiary accountability-demand. 
 
Transparency and Organisational Diversity 
 
The most obvious differences across case studies emerge in the area of governance 
and finance. The observed diversity can be explained by looking at the different size and type 
of CSOs that, in turns, reflect different understandings of the concept of organisational 
transparency. Legal norms aimed at setting standards of transparency play also a significant 
role in the diversity detected.3 
                                               
3It is worth clarifying that the reference here is to the legal framework abolished by the Third-Sector Reform (August 2017), given that data 
have been gathered and analysed before the new law entered into force. In that respect, it is equally important to clarify that Italian CSOs 
are currently subjected to a transitional legal regime that should allow them to progressively adhere to new legal requirements introduced 
by the Reform.      
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Alpha, which is the largest CSO among case studies, does publish online a simplified 
version of its financial budget (approved by the national assembly of member representatives) 
but it does not disclose any documents regarding the organisational performance. Selected 
documents related to organisational performance (such as board’s minutes) are nonetheless 
available on a digital database to which every member has access. By doing so, Alpha fulfils 
its transparency duty internally towards its beneficiaries. At the same time, it was 
acknowledged that the lack of external disclosure of this information could be limiting for a 
CSO of that size, irrespective of its membership nature: 
In terms of awareness of formal documents among our members we have done a lot. 
Maybe, we could do a bit more in spreading these documents externally given that 
we are an organisation that has an impact on public opinion, given its large 
membership, and considering that we constantly intervene in the political and cultural 
debate (Manager, Alpha). 
Essentially, the interviewee claimed that Alpha should share its documents beyond 
the membership level because of its size. Nonetheless, it was subsequently noted by the same 
respondent that the size itself of Alpha can paradoxically represent an obstacle in developing 
comprehensive reports on organisational performance:  
It is hard to gather data on what our single associate clubs [spread over the national 
territory] do because they are subjected to different fiscal regimes and they engage in 
different kind of charitable activities; for this reason, different reporting systems are 
employed…they [local clubs] are like the ‘Maritime Republics’. When it comes to 
reporting, it is not easy to have an accurate general picture as we do not have a 
‘common language’ which, in turn, makes companions hard (Manager, Alpha). 
With regard to Beta and Gamma, both CSOs disclose their budget online. Because 
Beta and Gamma operate internationally, they are legally obligated to do so in order to obtain 
formal accreditation within the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In both cases, the financial 
budget is externally audited, once it has been discussed and approved by the Annual General 
Assembly. Beta is also the only organisation that discloses a detailed report online that shows 
progress made in detail, year by year, in relation to each campaign or project.  
On the contrary, the two smallest CSOs (Epsilon and Delta) do not publish their 
financial budget externally nor do they disclose documents related to performance-reporting. 
In particular, Epsilon performs financial transparency towards its beneficiaries by discussing 
and approving the financial budget on the occasion of the Annual National Assembly, but 
continual performance-reporting disclosure is selective according to this research respondent:   
In terms of information sharing, everything is very accessible and understandable 
except one thing: I do not know what the board of directors are currently planning 
because the minutes are not available to individual members. The minutes are shared 
only when they are very important and, in such a case, information is circulated 
through e-mails or private chats on social media. This is, however, the exception, not 
the rule” (Member Representative 2, Epsilon). 
As to Omega, there are essentially two main reasons behind the lack of disclosure of 
governance and financial information. First, external performance-reporting can be very 
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demanding, in terms of time and resources, for a small organisation that relies solely on ten 
volunteers to carry out its charitable work. Because of its small size, Delta – like Epsilon – is 
not bound by any legal duty to disclose the budget externally. Secondly, this organisation works 
primarily with vulnerable subjects (victims of domestic abuses and children); this poses a 
matter of protection of their privacy, which is prioritised over transparency.  
This is the main reason why Omega cannot easily divulge detailed information about 
many organisational aspects to the public. Rather, a tailored performance report is shared 
privately with relevant stakeholders (including service-users) when Omega is required to 
comply with mandatory reporting requirements arising from specific projects or grants.   
 
Organisational Chart, Languages and Digital Tools 
 
The disclosure of information, or conversely a failure to do so, as well as the way in 
which information is communicated have implications on the accountability-demand abilities 
of beneficiaries. Organisational transparency is not merely limited to a simple disclosure 
exercise as its main purpose is to generate interaction between the recipient of the information 
and the organisation.   
The research findings show that such interaction is particularly evident when CSOs 
deploy an organisational chart. The latter facilitates organisational accountability by helping 
beneficiaries to identify roles, responsibilities and competences at a managerial level. 
Essentially, the disclosure of an organisational chart allows stakeholders to develop an 
awareness of how accountability is operationalised, especially in highly structured 
organisations. Indeed, research respondents of those CSOs with organisational charts in place 
seem to have a good understanding of organisational accountability processes: “If I have a 
problem I know perfectly whom the manager is that I should speak with” (Member 
Representative 3, Alpha).  
In fact, Alpha sends the organisational chart to its beneficiaries via email. This chart 
not only indicates functions and responsibilities (divided by thematic and territorial areas) of 
each manager, as regulated by the Articles of Association, but it also considers customary roles 
and duties carried out by managers beyond the Articles of Association. An online 
organisational chart is also available on Gamma’s website and research participants did not 
report any issue in identifying managers in charge of dealing certain matters. Similarly, 
organization Epsilon has developed a digital interactive organisational chart that allows 
members, and more broadly online visitors, to easily identify managers responsible for 
thematic or territorial areas. Interestingly, a research respondent highlighted that, even if 
dialogue is facilitated by the presence of organisational chart, managers might not be willing 
to listen: “I can identify the manager I should speak with if there is an issue. But sometimes 
there is a lack of willingness to listen. Criticisms are often perceived negatively rather than as 
constructive” (Member Representative 2, Epsilon).   
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This statement demonstrates that the deployment of an organisational chart not only 
helps beneficiaries to identify the person responsible within the organisation’s governance for 
certain issues, but it also aids the identification of gaps in the way in which dialogue is 
practiced. In contrast, the failure to disclose an organisational chart can cause ambiguities in 
relation to the identification of organisational processes or managerial responsibilities and it 
also negatively affects the ability of beneficiaries to hold CSOs accountable. This is precisely 
the case of Beta where a respondent pointed out that, in absence of an organisational chart, it 
is hard to identify the person entitled to deal with certain organisational matters: “For a while, 
our point of reference was a staff member, as the manager did not answer our enquires in 
relation to different matters. We were conscious that this was not his [staff member’s] role” 
(local activist/ supporter 1 and 2, Beta).  
When it comes to communication, another issue is the language utilised to spread 
information with beneficiaries. This is not a marginal matter for those CSOs, like Beta, that 
operate internationally and provide services in foreign countries. A recent research on local 
languages and international-NGOs has highlighted three key issues in that respect: a) languages 
generally have a low priority in development as development agencies assume that NGOs have 
sufficient language capacity to communicate with aid recipients, but few NGOs have language 
policies in place; b) many development concepts that are essential to NGO work are not directly 
translatable into other languages (e.g. accountability, resilience and sustainability); and c) these 
language problems have negative effects on community participation, such as exclusion from 
participating in project design, and providing feedback on NGO performance (Crack et al., 18). 
When CSOs provide services in foreign countries, it is vitally important that organisational 
documents are translated into local languages spoken by beneficiaries (Tesseur, 2018). Even if 
Beta translates background information into local languages, those documents about 
organisational governance and finance are published exclusively in Italian. This matter was 
labelled as a “fundamental issue” by a Beta manager:“One of the fundamental issues with our 
foreign partners is that our website has not been fully translated, neither in English nor in the 
local languages spoken in those countries where we operate” (Manager, Beta).  
Predictably, this issue was also remarked on by a representative of local partners:  
There is a problem with language as we speak predominantly Arabic and no English. 
We do communicate in English with Beta…as to the digital communication, we 
[local partners] have our own website, that is available in both Arabic and 
English…this is why people tend to consult our website more than the Beta one 
(Partners/Country Representative 1, Beta). 
Aside from the language used to communicate information, it is worth noticing that 
even the employment of certain tools to spread information can be problematic in reaching 
certain beneficiaries. Research findings highlight that digital tools (website, social media and 
digital database) are the most popular means employed by CSOs to disseminate information 
towards their stakeholders. The popularity of digital means, and their widespread use in 
fulfilling transparency duties, is self-evident: they are fast, low-cost and aid simultaneous 
communication between people located in different geographical areas. Despite their 
popularity, digital tools cannot be easily reached by everyone even if they are perceived as 
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intrinsically accessible. In particular, a research participant has cast doubt on the inclusive 
nature of digital tools warning that the internet should not be the only means through which 
information are shared with beneficiaries:  
We have an efficient database to which members have access. There, every single 
piece of information and current activities about the organisation is available. But, I 
would not give the maximum score to this question because nowadays a large portion 
of information is accessible only through online tools. The Internet can exclude some 
people (Member Representative 3, Alpha).  
 
b. Participation 
 
The table demonstrates that all CSOs, with an exception made for Delta, have in place 
mechanisms of participation through which beneficiaries contribute through representatives to 
the decision-making process. 
In Alpha, member representatives are elected periodically by local clubs to represent 
their constituencies at a national and regional level. Once elected at local level, member 
representatives sit in the national assembly that, in turn, elect board members. Within the 
national assembly, member representatives have the right to run for board of directors. An 
identical mechanism of delegation of power is adopted by Epsilon where membership 
representation is articulated on multiple levels of governance (local, regional and national).    
Aside from these two membership CSOs, mechanisms of indirect representation occur 
in service-provider CSOs (Beta and Gamma) through representatives of associate voluntary 
groups, third-country/local partner’s representatives and spokesmen of local grassroots 
organisations. Representatives of voluntary groups and of local grassroots organisations 
contribute to the election of board members by exercising a right to vote in the general 
assembly. Instead, third-country representatives are simply observatory members in the Annual 
National Assembly of Beta and they do not exercise the right to vote when it comes to appoint 
board members or approve the annual financial budget.  
Among the case studies, Delta represents the only exception to the rule, as it does not 
provide any formal mechanism of representation to service-users or volunteers on whom it 
significantly relies on to carry out its work. Looking at its organisational structure, Delta is a 
flat organisation, self-managed by volunteers, where the manager exercises very little 
supervisory power over them. Obviously, the small size of Delta explains the absence of formal 
hierarchical levels of management and the lack of formal mechanisms of 
accountability.Previous research on the matter clarified that small charities typically establish 
very tight relationships with beneficiaries developing a high level of trust, known also as 
“organic accountability”, such that formal mechanisms would introduce unnecessary 
bureaucracy (Pratt, 2009). Additionally, for small CSOs the matter is often less about 
willingness and more about the inability to afford the establishment and compliance with 
formal accountability mechanisms (Brody, 2004). 
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Besides indirect representation, findings suggest that evaluation tools and direct 
means of participation are deployed selectively by CSOs. The reference here is to beneficiary 
feedback, onsite visits (meeting onsite with local communities), evaluation meetings, 
satisfaction surveys and an online voting system. To be accurate, two case studies (Alpha and 
Delta) out of five do not employ any of these tools at all, whereas, Epsilon has only one means 
of direct participation in place (online voting system).  
At first glance, the diversity observed seems to mark the difference between 
membership and service-provider CSOs, in which the latter need to engage with beneficiaries 
through the employment of direct means of participation in order to involve them in decision-
making and legitimise self-appointed managers or leaders. Based on this reasoning, 
membership CSOs can rely exclusively on indirect means participation, as members are 
simultaneously (elected) leaders and service-users. This would imply that direct means of 
evaluation/participation could be superfluous in membership CSOs. 
Although the above observation is valid, a more detailed analysis of the 
findingsreveals that accountability in membership CSOs can be exercised beyond indirect 
participation, especially when it comes to advocacy campaigns, and that the lack of 
implementation of direct means of involvement/evaluation is perceived negatively at the 
membership level. At the same time, evidence from the fieldsuggests that direct means of 
participation/evaluation are implemented inconsistently over time by service-provider CSOs 
and that their employment depends on donor and/or third-party requirements, type of project 
or campaign to be implemented and nature of service delivered. 
 
Accountability beyond Beneficiary Representatives in Membership CSOs 
 
As noted above, the absence of direct means of participation is a common trend among 
membership CSOs. These CSOs rely on representation mechanisms and organisational 
decisions are taken following the principle of democratic majority through elected members. 
Alpha falls exactly in this category:  
There is a constant debate that takes place within the governing bodies of the 
organisation; especially because the president is very inclined to a culture of ‘opinion 
exchange’ among board members. But the employment of formalised assessment 
tools to gather members’ views (such as a feedback form) is very informal. I realise 
that we could do more in terms of evaluations involving our members directly at a 
grassroots level, but this is not easy: we are too big (Manager, Alpha). 
In this statement, the respondent clarified how decisions are made at managerial level 
and then she acknowledged that all members could be more involved in the decision-making 
process though assessment tools. However, the employment of these tools can be unfeasible 
due to the large size of Alpha. It is worth recalling here that the same manager provided a 
similar explanation, referring to the organisational size, when she was asked about the failure 
of Alpha to disclosure a comprehensive document on performance-reporting. If, one the one 
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hand, the large size of Alpha is a strength because it implies that this organisation can rely 
heavily on its large membership to claim organisational legitimacy, on the other hand, Alpha’s 
size can represent an obstacle when it comes to operationalising accountability through direct 
means of participation.  
Indeed, the lack of means of direct participation that could allow individual members 
to be involved in the organisational governance beyond their representatives was also perceived 
as a deficit by one respondent: 
The ability to involve the membership in planning activity (and during the 
implementation stage) is very weak and this is why national campaigns are 
implemented inconsistently at grassroots level. It is a shame because when you have 
such a big membership you can be 100% sure that there can be members who can 
genuinely give their contribution in terms of knowledge and skills (Member 
Representative 2, Alpha).    
The same respondent then explained that the development of participatory 
mechanisms would be desirable, but realistically this can be impeded by the size and by the 
diversity of Alpha’s membership, thus agreeing with the manager. Metaphorically, the research 
participant compared Alpha to an elephant because of its large size: “Ideally, we need a 
sustainable management model characterised by a bottom-up approach but, I am aware, that 
our association is an elephant characterised by a longstanding tradition and a plural 
membership” (Member Representative 2, Alpha).    
Predominant reliance on representative bodies was also seen in negative terms by an 
Epsilon member, who complained about the limited interaction between the grassroots and 
managerial levels of the organisation: “In general, the organisation is very centralised, and 
decisions are taken by high-ranking managers. There is no formal instrument to review goals 
of ongoing activities.”(Member Representative 2, Epsilon) 
By comparing and contrasting prior literature on the topic with the above data, it 
emerges that none of the research respondents (especially managers) have referred the limited 
value (due to a lack of skills or knowledge) of beneficiaries’ participation in organisational 
policy-making nor have they argued that formal beneficiary participation is too time-intensive 
and increases the governance complexity (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2009; Wellens and Jegers, 
2014). 
Additionally, the findings show that membership CSOs can be held accountable by 
members through voting for organisational leaders or even running for leadership. As 
previously argued in the academic literature, beneficiary accountability beyond mere 
representatives can amount either to ‘exit’ by revoking membership or joining another 
organisation, or ‘loyalty’ by attempting to reform the organisation by influencing leaders and 
shaping organisational policies or campaigns (Ebrahim, 2010). 
In particular, the empirical findings document that this kind of accountability dynamic 
occurs when membership-based CSOs launch advocacy campaigns on policy issues that can 
potentially divide their membership leading to internal disagreements. The Italian 
Constitutional Referendum (held on 4th December 2016) represents a good example that 
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perfectly fits in with this accountability dynamic. In brief, voters were asked to approve or 
reject, through a referendum, amendments to the Constitution aimed at reforming a) the 
composition and powers of two Chambers of the Parliament (the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate), b) the legislative process and c) the division of devolved and reserved issues between 
State, Regions and local administrations (Province and Comuni).4  
On that occasion, many CSOs decided to take part in the campaign, declaring openly 
whether they were for or against the Constitutional Reform. This was exactly the case for Alpha 
and Epsilon who took a firm stand on the matter. In particular, the decision of Alpha to run a 
campaign, and thus commit as an organisation, to reject the Reform made part of its 
membership feeling disappointed:  
On the occasion of the Constitutional Referendum, some of them [members] 
complained to us directly saying that it was not appropriate to take a clear stand as an 
association. Hundreds of people got in touch with us spontaneously, without having 
been asked to do so and despite the absence of a formal feedback mechanism 
(Manager, Alpha).  
This was confirmed by a member representative of Alpha who made clear that many 
members strongly believed in the political neutrality of the organisation and that they were not 
adequately consulted when the campaign was decided at the managerial level: “As to the 
Constitutional Referendum campaign, many members were unsatisfied because they believed 
that, as a civil association, we should be politically neutral” (Member Representative 3, 
Alpha).  
Epsilon experienced a similar internal fragmentation within its membership that 
subsequently led to the exit of two members from the organisation: “We took a unanimous 
position on the Constitutional Reform and we were all campaigning across the national 
territory to support the new constitutional amendments, except two members who left the 
association” (Member Representative 1, Epsilon). 
To sum up, members were trying to challenge the position of Alpha on the 
referendum, while in Epsilon the dissident members were a small minority who opted to leave 
the organisation. These two different approaches adopted by members to challenge their 
respective organisations can be explained as follows. On the one hand, Alpha is a plural and 
well-established CSO with a large membership that brings together individuals with different 
views on political matters and share common principles and values. Epsilon however, is a 
recently-formed association in which members adhere to a set political agenda. It is important 
to highlight here that the debate on whether CSOs should openly campaign for the 
Constitutional Referendum has been a burning issue for many membership-based associations. 
                                               
4The Constitutional Reform was proposed by the Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, and the ruling party (Democratic Party). After several 
amendments were made to the proposed reform by both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, a referendum was called after the formal 
request of more than one fifth of the members of both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, under Article 138 of the Italian 
Constitution. 59.11% of voters voted against the reform. Following the outcome of the vote, Mattero Renzi resigned as Prime Minister 
and Paolo Gentiloni was subsequently appointed as the new head of the Italian government. 
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Aside from those CSOs chosen for this research, the tension between the membership 
and managerial levels was very accentuated in many associations and, in the most extreme 
case, led to unilateral expulsions: for example, a member of the Italian Senate was not allowed 
to renew her membership to The National Association of Italian Partisans (ANPI) after she 
openly endorsed the Government supporting the Reform (La Repubblica, 2016). 
 
 Service-provider CSOs and the (selective) use of Participatory/Evaluation Tools 
 
As displayed in the table, direct means of participation and tools of assessment are 
implemented selectively across case studies. In broad terms, these means are employed 
predominantly by the two service-providers (Beta and Gamma), together with Epsilon that 
developed an online platform to allow members to vote on certain organisational issues. 
However, this digital platform was used in only one occasion, when members were called to 
vote to modify The Articles of Associations. For such a decision, it was necessary to involve 
the whole membership as required by the Articles of Association themselves. Except for this 
sporadic episode, this participatory tool has never been used again.  
As to Beta and Gamma, a detailed examination of the findings shows that feedback 
forms, satisfaction surveys, on-site and evaluation meetings were inconsistently implemented 
over the period (before, during, after projects or campaigns), and that their selective 
employment depends either on the nature of service provided or, alternatively, it is dictated by 
a donor’s or a certification body’s requirements.   
On-site visits to local communities are conducted by both CSOs when it comes to deal 
with emergencies and aid-delivery. Meetings in loco have been organised by Gamma to capture 
the needs of local communities affected by the earthquake that took place in central Italy 
(January 2017) prior to delivering aid, whereas Beta has done the same with displaced persons 
fleeing war and persecution in foreign countries. However, no formal review of the aid-delivery 
was subsequently conducted (neither when the project was being implemented nor at the end 
of it) to verify whether the service provided met the initial expectations of the local population. 
A research respondent explained such failure as follows: “When an organisation delivers 
emergency kits, it is assumed that they already know what people want and there is no need to 
carry out a review meeting” (Partners/Country Representative 2, Beta) 
On this matter, it worth recalling that some humanitarian-NGOs have begun assessing 
their service-delivery by monitoring through ongoing feedback whether the needs of aid-
recipients are being met. For example, Global Communities – which works with vulnerable 
displaced persons in Syria – has provided a hotline number to receive calls, SMS or WhatsApp 
messages so that beneficiaries can express their view on every kind of assistance provided: the 
feedback received was invaluable for the organisation and when managers realised that 
beneficiaries would prefer vouchers rather than goods, the program was amended accordingly 
(Weiss, 2016). 
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When it comes to ordinary projects, the involvement of beneficiaries to plan and review 
activities occurs more systematically. In particular, Beta carries out evaluation meetings – 
except for small activities – before and during the implementation of the project. Interestingly, 
it turned out that these evaluation meetings are generally preferred over evaluation tools by 
beneficiaries themselves: 
After launching a project, we conduct review meetings (regular strategy meetings) to 
amend goals initially set, especially if we realise that these goals are not realistic. In 
these meetings we focus both on positive and negative things and we work together 
to overcome problems. There is also the Annual Conference with all partners. 
Basically, we all gather in the same place and we discuss, assess and rate all 
initiatives, except for small activities that do not need any formal revision. Evaluation 
materials (such as feedback) have been employed in the past but we did not find them 
very useful compared with evaluation meetings, which instead culminate in reports 
with interesting data (Partners/Country Representative 1, Beta).  
As already observed by other researchers, beneficiaries or their representatives can 
have the feeling that some participatory mechanisms, such as evaluation materials, are merely 
symbolic and sometimes dominate effective participation in organisational policy-making 
(Wellens and Jegers, 2014).  
Although evaluation materials are not perceived as useful as evaluation meetings, their 
employment at the end project is often a donor’s requirement. However, data emerging from 
such an evaluation are not shared with beneficiaries: “Some donors ask for people’s feedback 
on a sample of five or ten percent of service-users and the data are presented to donors, not to 
us” (Partners/Country Representative 2, Beta). 
As already documented in earlier literature, these participatory meetings are often 
undertaken in response to specific requirements from donors to hold such meetings, and CSO 
workers tend to gather documental and photographic evidence of beneficiary engagement 
primarily as part of their reports to donors (Agyemang et al., 2009). 
As to Gamma, the use of evaluation tools is a consolidated practice. Evaluation tools 
are frequently used before a project is launched. Besides dialogue with voluntary group 
representatives within the governing bodies of the organisation, Gamma consistently uses 
online feedback forms to choose the nature and content of advocacy campaigns, while, 
satisfaction surveys are gathered with final service-users at the end of a project: 
We are primarily involved in project planning as we know really well the needs of 
the field. Then, we cyclically review goals with the managers. Satisfaction surveys 
with final service-users are sometimes used at the very end of the project, because it 
is a requirement to obtain accreditation from an external qualitative insurance body 
(Voluntary Group Representative 1, Gamma).  
Just like Beta, the use of satisfaction surveys at the end of a project is due to external 
requirements imposed by certification or accreditation bodies.  
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c. Complaints Procedure 
 
The last key aspect of beneficiary accountability is the presence a formal complaints 
procedure to handle allegations of wrongdoing and to settle disputes between beneficiaries and 
CSOs. Earlier literature on the topic has emphasised that the presence of a complaints 
procedure proves how seriously an organisation is in embracing accountability and that the 
absence of effective procedures can diminish other accountability mechanisms (Burall and 
Neligan, 2009). 
Regrettably, only two CSOs (Alpha and Epsilon) out of five CSOs have a formal 
mechanism in place to deal with complaints made by beneficiaries. The analysis below 
demonstrates that even if a complaints procedure is in place, it might not have all the essential 
requirements to function adequately, and that the failure to establish a procedure can be polarly 
seen either as an accountability deficit or as a neutral non-issue.  
The complaints procedure established by Alpha is particularly well designed and 
presents all the necessary characteristics to function well. Firstly, there is an ad hoc committee 
composed by three non-members to ensure neutrality over disputes. Secondly, the Articles of 
Association provide the exact period within which the committee must deal with a complaint, 
so that complaints are dealt with in a timely manner. Thirdly, there is an appeal mechanism 
through which the parties can challenge the decisions issued by the committee. Fourthly, the 
parties are kept informed confidentially about their claims. There is also a tailored registry that 
is regularly updated every time a complaint is filed. According to research respondents, Alpha 
handles around five complaints a year and, in practice, the complaints procedure is a last resort 
that is used when other means of reconciliation to settle a dispute have failed. 
In contrast, the committee established by Epsilon is composed by internal members. 
It does not provide an appeal system to challenge decisions and it does not ensure 
confidentiality of the parties involved in the controversy. Annually, the average of complaints 
handled by Epsilon is between one to three.  
As to other case studies, the Delta manager justified the lack of a complaints procedure 
on obvious grounds related to the organisational size: “we are too small to have one”. When 
asked about the complaints procedure, Beta manager admitted that the lack of a formal 
mechanism is one of the “main weaknesses”, in terms of accountability performance, and then 
she clarified that “(…) when I meet beneficiaries personally, I ask them to be frank. I encourage 
them to tell me if there is something wrong. I usually receive and handle complaints personally 
together with the organisational director and relevant staff member” (Manager, Beta).  
Another respondent from the same organisation, who shared his thoughts on the 
matter, claimed that there should instead be a proper and functioning procedure in place: “There 
is no complaints mechanism and I believe there should be a clear procedure to handle 
complaints made by partners and staff members” (Partners/Country Representative 1, Beta). 
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An identical response to Beta’s manager was given by Gamma’s manager. When 
questioned about the lack of a complaints procedure, she clarified that complaints are handled 
personally by managers and/or by the organisation director. However, contrary to Beta, neither 
the manager nor other respondents viewed such an accountability gap in negative terms. 
Rather, the answer given by the Gamma’s manager referred to a lack of compelling drivers 
behind the establishment of a complaints procedure: “we never thought that we really need a 
procedure to handle complaints”.  
Similarly, the other two respondents appear to have a neutral opinion on the matter 
and one of them argued that he was actually satisfied with the way his complaint was informally 
handled by Gamma:    
We do not have a complaints procedure but, obviously, there can be issues. In such 
cases, complaints are handled directly by relevant board members. Once I made a 
complaint and it was handled in a timely and impartial manner: I was satisfied with 
the outcome of my claim (Voluntary Group Representative 1, Gamma). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Based on the data discussion, the following conclusion can be drawn. In general, 
beneficiary accountability is performed differently by diverse CSOs and it appears weak, 
informal and inconsistent across case studies, especially in relation to a complaints procedure 
and direct means of participation. In such cases, mechanisms of beneficiary accountability are 
poorly implemented regardless of congenital differences among CSOs (e.g. size, type and 
nature).  
When it comes to transparency, the research findings suggest that the disclosure of 
organisational information, as well as the way in which information is communicated can have 
implications on the accountability-demand abilities of beneficiaries, facilitating interaction 
between the recipient of the information and the organisation. The research findings show that 
this interaction is particularly evident when CSOs deploy an organisational chart. The chart 
facilitates accountability by helping beneficiaries to identify roles, responsibilities and 
competences at the managerial level. Deploying organisational charts is therefore highly 
desirable for all CSOs to reach a minimum standard of beneficiary accountability. In this 
context, it is also important to communicate information to beneficiaries in the language they 
speak, especially when it comes to CSOs operating internationally as confirmed by both in the 
pair of research respondents (manager and beneficiaries) in Beta. In addition to the language 
used to communicate information, findings indicate that even the employment of certain 
communication tools to spread information can be problematic in reaching certain 
beneficiaries. Nowadays, digital tools are the most popular means employed to disseminate 
information to stakeholders. Despite their popularity, digital tools cannot be easily reachable 
by everyone as documented by a research respondent. Depending on the kind of information 
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that needs to be disseminated and the targeting audience, CSOs should use multiple tools of 
communication including the most traditional ones.  
As to participation, the absence of direct means of participation is a common trend 
among membership CSOs, as these organisations rely on representation mechanisms and 
decisions taken following the principle of the democratic majority of elected members. 
However, findings confirm that beneficiaries wish to be involved beyond mere representation 
through direct means of participation, acknowledging nonetheless that the employment of these 
means can be unfeasible for large-membership CSOs. The extent to which direct means of 
participation can be implemented for membership-CSOs depends heavily on organisational 
size, but the mere fact that an organisation is too large should not be used as an excuse to avoid 
the matter: large CSOs have sufficient financial and human capacities that can be invested to 
accomplish their members’ demands. On the contrary, direct means of participation and tools 
of assessment are implemented and employed predominantly, yet selectively, by service-
providers More specifically, the findings report that the selective implementation of 
evaluation/participatory tools in service-provider CSOs depends on many factors ranging from 
donor (or third party) requirements to the type of service delivered. The findings further suggest 
that some means of direct accountability, especially evaluation meetings, are perceived by 
beneficiaries as more helpful than feedback mechanisms, because data emerging from such 
assessments are not shared with beneficiaries. The most important recommendation on this 
matter is to share the outcome of the evaluation with beneficiaries – and thus not only with 
donors – because the essence of feedback rests on the idea of a loop which requires CSOs to 
cyclically discuss evaluation outcomes with the targeting group after the data gathering phase.  
As concerns the establishment of a complaints procedure, findings suggest that the 
presence of a formal mechanism to handle allegations of wrongdoing, and to settle disputes 
between beneficiaries and CSOs, is limited only to membership CSOs. Interestingly, research 
data points out that the lack of a complaints procedure was polarly seen by participants either 
as an accountability deficit or as a neutral non-issue. The establishment of a mechanism of 
redress to handle a beneficiary’s complaint is, however, highly expected by CSOs regardless 
of their differences with the sole exception of small CSOs. TheThird-Sector Reform requires 
Italian CSOs to form an internal monitoring body (Organo di Controllo) that oversees 
compliance with organisational, legal and financial norms and, simultaneously, assess whether 
the organisation is managed efficiently in light of its mission and its charitable aims (Article 
30, 6). This body can also conduct internal inspections (Article 30, 8). The establishment of 
this new body is mandatory for those CSOs who have more than five employees and with 
income above 220,000 Euros for two consecutive tax years. From August 2017 onwards, CSOs 
that meet the legal criteria are legally obligated to set up an internal monitoring body.  
In terms of contribution to the academic debate, the research findings about 
transparency are aligned with evidence emerging from recent research on local languages and 
international-NGOs which show that language barriers have negative effects on community 
participation, such as exclusion from participating (Crack et al., 2018). In contrast to prior 
literature on beneficiary participation, it emerges that none of the research respondents 
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(especially managers) have referred the limited value (due to a lack of skills or knowledge) of 
beneficiaries’ participation in organisational policy-making, nor have they argued that formal 
beneficiary participation is time-consuming and increases the governance complexity 
(O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2009; Wellens and Jegers, 2014).The evidence also suggests that the 
implementation of participatory mechanisms is in some casesdependent on a donor’s 
requirement: earlier literature has precisely argued that the implementation of beneficiary 
accountability can be related to, and it is often the result of, of coercive pressure exercised by 
powerful stakeholders (like donors) upon the organisation (Berghmans et al., 2017). Another 
study suggested that donors frequently see themselves as proxies for beneficiaries by 
encouraging their participation in organisation decision-making and that beneficiaries 
recognise that CSOs could not operate without the donor’s support (Connolly and Hyndman, 
2017). Moreover, the findings on beneficiary participation have strengthened previous research 
on small CSOs, confirming that such organisations establish very tight relationships with 
beneficiaries, developing a high level of trust and, therefore, formal mechanisms would 
introduce unnecessary bureaucracy (Pratt, 2009).  
Lastly, research findings indicate that the lack of a complaints procedure at the 
organisational level was polarising: seen by participants either as an accountability deficit or 
as a neutral non-issue. Previous literature on complaints procedures has never detected that the 
lack of a mechanism to handle complaints could be perceived, even by beneficiary themselves, 
as a non-issue. More research in that respect would be therefore desirable, given that earlier 
literature on the topic has emphasised that the presence of a complaints procedure proves how 
seriously an organisation is in embracing accountability, and that the absence of effective 
procedures can diminish other accountability mechanisms (Burall and Neligan, 2009). 
From a methodological perspective, the employment of a multiple case study, together 
with the use of data triangulation through highly structured interviews with numerous 
respondents, has provided a richness of data to investigate the matter of downward 
accountability. The employment of this methodology also facilitated comparisons between 
substantially different CSOs, allowing commonalities and differences to emerge easily among 
case studies. The methodology employed also brought a unique perspective on the matter 
investigated: the direct and practical experiences of beneficiaries with organisational 
accountability tools. However, the findings should be interpreted with some caution, because 
this analysis includes only five CSOs selected in a non-random way. It is for this reason that 
research findings cannot be statistically generalised to all Italian CSOs. 
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